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Abstract	This	article	analyses	the	politics	of	copyright	and	copying.	Copyright	is	an	increasingly	important	driver	of	the	modern	economy,	but	this	does	not	exhaust	its	significance.	It	matters,	we	argue,	not	just	for	the	distribution	of	rewards	and	resources	in	the	creative	industries,	but	as	a	site	within	which	established	political	concerns	–	collective	and	individual	interests	and	identities	-	are	articulated	and	negotiated,	and	within	which	notions	of	‘originality’,	‘creativity’	and	‘copying’	are	politically	constituted.		Set	against	the	background	of	the	
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increasing	economic	value	attributed	to	the	creative	industries,	the	impact	of	digitalization	on	them,	and	the	European	Union’s	Digital	Single	Market	strategy,	the	article	reveals	how	copyright	policy,	and	the	underlying	assumptions	about	‘copying’	and	‘creativity’,	express	(often	unexamined)	political	values	and	ideologies.	Drawing	on	a	close	reading	of	policy	statements,	official	reports,	court	cases,	and	interviews	with	stakeholders,	we	explore	the	multiple	political	aspects	of	copyright,	showing	how	copyright	policy	operates	to	privilege	particular	interests	and	practices,	and	to	acknowledge	only	specific	forms	of	creative	endeavour.		
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Introduction	Our	argument	is	that	copyright	and	copyright	policy,	typically	the	province	of	intellectual	property	lawyers,	warrants	the	closer	scrutiny	of	political	scientists,	because	copyright	affects	the	distribution	of	resources	and	rewards	and	because	it	manages	the	tension	between	collective	and	individual	rights.		How	these	matters	are	resolved	is	important	materially	and	culturally	for	all	societies,	and	their	resolution	is	a	consequence	of	political	processes	and	political	values.	But	there	is,	we	suggest,	more	at	stake	than	this.	Copyright	also	serves	to	construct	ideas	of	‘creativity’,	‘originality’	and	‘copying’.	These	are	ideas	that	matter	profoundly	to	the	vision	of	the	liberal	society	and	the	individuals	who	constitute	it.	As	John	Stuart	Mill	(1972/1859:	132)	wrote	in	‘On	Liberty’:	‘It	will	not	be	denied	by	anybody,	that	originality	is	a	valuable	element	in	human	affairs.’		In	this	article,	we	unpack	the	political	principles	and	judgements	that	constitute	copyright	and	copyright	policy,	revealing	both	how	they	affect	the	distribution	of	resources	and	opportunities,	but	also	how	they	construct	modern	understandings	of	originality	and	creativity.					According	to	the	Department	of	Culture,	Media	and	Sport	(DCMS,	2015),	in	2014	the	creative	industries	were	worth	£76.9bn	to	the	UK	economy;	their	exports	were	valued	at	£17.3bn;	and	they	provided	1.71m	jobs.	These	industries	–	music,	film,	television,	video	games,	among	others	–	are	heavily	dependent	on	copyright	in	realizing	their	economic	worth.	The	music	business	in	particular,	according	to	Patrik	Wikstrom	(2009:	12),	is	to	be	understood	as	a	‘copyright	industry’.	Indeed,	the	body	that	represents	that	industry,	UK	Music,	describes	copyright	as	the	‘currency	of	creativity’	(UK	Music,	2010)	and	as	‘the	bedrock	of	the	music	industry’	(UK	Music,	2014).		
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Digitalisation	has	heightened	the	importance	of	copyright,	facilitating	piracy	and	illegal	file-sharing,	and	impacting	on	almost	all	aspects	of	the	production,	distribution	and	consumption	of	creative	content.	These	transformations	drive	the	EU’s	determination	to	create	a	Digital	Single	Market	(DSM),	and	to	engage	in	a	radical	overhaul	of	the	copyright	regime	(European	Commission,	2015;	Rosati,	2013).1	They	also	lie	behind	national	initiatives	to	adapt	to	digitalisation2,	and	the	concomitant	need	to	reform	copyright	(Hargreaves,	2011).	These	reform	programmes	have	attracted	intense	political	lobbying	in	Brussels	and	elsewhere	by	the	corporate	stakeholders	and	those	suspicious	of	their	motives	(for	example,	the	Open	Rights	Society,	the	Electronic	Frontier	Foundation	and	European	Digital	Rights	[EDRi]).	The	EU’s	consultation	on	copyright	attracted	9,500	replies	and	more	than	11,000	messages	(Dobusch,	2014).			This	heightened	attention	on	copyright	is	reflected	in	electoral	agendas.	In	the	2015	UK	General	Election,	the	Conservative	(2015:	42)	and	the	Liberal	Democrat	(2015:	37)	parties	both	referred	to	copyright	in	their	manifestos.3		The	Green	Party	called	for	‘a	comprehensive	Digital	Bill	of	Rights’,	with	the	intention	of	reducing	the	role	of	the	market	in	cultural	production	and	consumption	(Green	Party,	2015:	61).		And	while	the	Pirate	Party,	formed	specifically	to	reform	copyright,	may	no	longer	be	the	force	in	Europe	that	it	once	was	(Cammaerts,	2015;	Fredriksson,	2014),	its	sole	representative	in	the	European																																																									1	The	UK’s	decision	to	leave	the	EU	is	unlikely	to	affect	significantly	its	copyright	law,	although	it	will	cease	to	be	subject	to	subsequent	interpretations	of	that	law	by	the	CJEU.		2	See,	for	example,	‘The	UK’s	Vision	for	a	Digital	Europe’;	available	at:		https://engage.number10.gov.uk/digital-single-market/uk-vision-for-eu-digital-economy-single-market.pdf.	3	The	Labour	Party,	the	SNP	and	UKIP,	however,	made	no	mention	of	copyright.	
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parliament,	Julia	Reda,	is	the	official	rapporteur	for	the	EU’s	copyright	consultation	exercise	(Reda,	2015).				 Despite	its	increasing	political	salience,	copyright	has	tended	to	be	overlooked	by	disciplines	other	than	law.4	In	particular,	political	studies	has	been	slow	to	acknowledge	its	significance,	although	it	is	important	to	note	the	contribution	of	work	by	Jeremy	Waldron	(1993)	on	the	political	theory	of	copyright,	Ronald	Bettig	(1996)	on	the	political	economy	of	intellectual	property,	Jessica	Litman	(2006)	on	the	making	of	US	copyright	policy,	and	Debora	Halbert	(2014)	and	Blayne	Haggart	(2014)	on	the	global	politics	of	the	international	copyright	regime.	This	article	is	a	further	sortie	into	this	field.	We	explore	the	political	ideas	that	inform	both	copyright	policy	and	constitute	the	underlying	practices	of	copying	and	creativity.	We	concentrate	on	the	music	industry,	and	we	analyse	how	political	values	and	assumptions	underpin,	first,	existing	copyright	regimes,	and	we	examine	how	political	judgements	inform	ideas	of		a	‘work’	that	may	be	‘a	copy’	or	an	‘original’	and	attribute	responsibility	to	an	‘author’.	In	making	our	case,	we	draw	on	policy	documents,	legal	cases	and	interviews	with	key	actors	in	the	music	industry.	We	show	how	copyright	policy	arbitrates	between	the	claims	of	individuals	and	those	of	society,	and	how	it	assigns	responsibility	and	agency.		In	these	respects,	it	is	political	in	the	sense	adopted	by	David	Runciman	(2014:	6):	‘the	collective	choices	that	bind	groups	of	people	to	live	in	a	particular	way’.	But	it	also	acts	politically	in	defining	
																																																								4	For	exceptions:	in	history,	see	Baldwin,	2014,	Cummings,	2013	and	Johns,	2010;	in	music	studies,	see	Frith	and	Marshall,	2004	and	McLeod	and	DiCola,	2011;	in	cultural	studies,	see	Decherney,	2013	and	Gaines,	1991;	in	sociology,	see	van	Eechoud,	2014.	
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‘originality’	and	‘creativity’,	and	in	determining	integrity	and	cultural	value	in	forms	of	communication.			
Background:	copyright	and	digitalisation	Copyright	policy	is	designed	to	reward	and	incentivize	creators,	and	to	enable	society	to	benefit	from	the	results	of	their	innovation	and	creativity	in	the	public	domain.	It	does	this	by	identifying	the	rights	of	creators	and	intermediaries	to	benefit	from	their	contributions.5		And	in	recognizing	and	regulating	these	rights	it	establishes	what	may	be	claimed	as	an	original	work	and	what	a	copy,	where	copying	may	refer	to	either	the	reproduction	of	a	work	for	commercial	purposes	or	to	the	plagiarizing	of	artistic	expression.		Both	forms	of	copying	have	been	affected	by	digitalisation.	Arguably	the	music	industry	has	felt	these	effects	most	sharply	(Negus,	2015).	The	recording	of	music	in	digital	form	(as	opposed	to	analogue)	has	meant	that	it	becomes	possible	for	copies	to	be	made	with	no	loss	of	quality;	it	has	also	meant	that	music	could	be	‘shared’	much	more	rapidly	than	was	possible	with	analogue	media	such	as	cassette	tapes	(and	even	with	copied	digital	CDs).	Within	the	legitimate	market,	digitalisation	has	made	possible	internet	radio	and	streaming	services	which	introduce	new	possibilities	and	problems	for	the	licensing	of	music	and	for	rights	collection.	Digitalisation	has	also	extended	the	creative	possibilities	available	to	artists,	making	the	sampling	of	music	a	great	deal	easier	and	more	sophisticated,	expanding	what	it	is	possible	to	deliver	in	a	live	
																																																								5	The	cast	list	is	long,	but	includes	composers,	performers,	record	labels,	and	publishers.		
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performance,		and	facilitating	new	forms	of	collaboration	and	integration	within,	and	between,	cultural	forms	and	media	platforms	(Vermallis	and	Herzog,	2015).			As	with	any	such	technological	change,	there	is	a	danger	of	exaggerating	the	extent	of	its	effects.	Illegal	copying	was	an	issue	before	digitalisation	and	before	the	internet,	hence	the	music	industry’s	campaign	for	blank	tape	levies	in	the	1980s	(Knopper,	2009).	Sampling	was	possible	with	analogue	tape	and	a	razor	blade.	And	there	have	always	been	those	who	contend	that	copyright	is	the	problem	for,	rather	than	the	solution	to,	enhancing	creativity	(Boldrin	and	Levine,	2008;	Lessig,	2005;	McLeod	and	DiCola,	2011).		But	even	if	digitalisation	merely	exacerbates	the	problems	of	copying,	there	remains	the	question	of	when	and	how	copying	is	deemed	acceptable	or	unacceptable	practice.	Copying	has	always	been	a	feature	of	cultural	practice	(Heylin,	2015;	Levine,	2014).		As	Jessica	Litman	(1990:	965;	her	emphasis)	writes:	‘…	the	very	act	of	authorship	in	
any	medium	is	more	akin	to	translation	and	recombination	than	it	is	to	creating	Aphrodite	from	the	foam	of	the	sea’.	Copyright,	therefore,	is	not	about	originals	versus	copies,	so	much	as	discerning	‘good’	from	‘bad’	copying,	and	in	determining	what	is	‘fair’	for	the	parties	involved.				
Constituting	copyright:	political	principles	and	political	interests	Copyright	itself	is	one	element	of	the	more	general	regulation	of	knowledge	and	its	creation.	The	particular	form	it	takes	is,	in	a	large	part,	a	matter	of	historical	contingency.	Nonetheless,	the	need	for	such	regulation,	and	the	debates	about	what	form	it	should	take,	are	informed	by	both	political	interests	and	political	principles.		
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In	the	music	industry,	competing	interests	have	been	most	vividly	revealed	in	controversies	over	the	royalty	payments	accruing	from	the	streaming	services	such	as	Spotify,	Deezer	and	Apple	Music	(Seabrook,	2014;	Cooke,	2015).	Artists	have	complained	that	multiple	streams	of	their	work	have	generated	a	pittance	in	royalties6,	and	have	acted	to	challenge	the	existing	system	by	creating	new	services	(such	as	Tidal),	by	withdrawing	their	catalogue	(as	Taylor	Swift	did	with	Spotify)	or	by	advocating	legislative	or	regulatory	change	(Dredge,	2015;	Linshi,	2014;	H.R.	1283	–	114th	Congress	and	Ne-Yo,	2015;	Williamson,	2015).	These	skirmishes	have	taken	place	against	a	backdrop	in	which	copyright,	according	to	Alex	Cummings,	(2013:	3-4),	is	increasingly	allied	to	corporate	strategy:	‘the	shift	from	a	hands-off	cultural	policy	that	emphasized	free	competition	(copy	and	compete)	to	a	more	aggressive	stance	that	protected	capital	investment	in	the	name	of	economic	growth.’	The	result,	according	to	US	critics	(Boyle,	2010;	Gillespie,	2007;	Herman,	2013),	has	been	a	victory	for	vested	corporate	interests	and	a	more	restricted	cultural	space.	Whatever	the	outcome,	these	struggles	have	been	couched	in	terms	of	competing	political	principles	(Toynbee,	2006).		Copyright	is	typically	understood	as	an	attempt	to	balance	the	rights	of	individual	creators	against	those	of	the	wider	society	to	enjoy	the	benefits	afforded	by	common	creative	culture.	This	is	as	true	for	those,	like	the	Pirate	Party,	who	challenge	the	copyright	regime,	as	it	is	for	those	who	endorse	its	current	form.		One	of	the	founding	principles	of	the	US	Constitution	is:	‘To	
																																																								6	The	writer	of	a	song	that	had	been	streamed	178	million	times	claimed	that	he	received	£3700	only	(Butterfly,	2015;	see	also	Byrne,	2013).	Others	have	suggested	that	rewards	from	streaming	are	not	out	of	line	with	standard	industry	practice	(Marshall,	2015).	
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promote	the	Progress	of	Science	and	useful	Arts,	by	securing	for	limited	Times	to	their	Authors	and	Inventors	the	exclusive	Right	to	their	respective	Writings	and	Discoveries.’	(Art.	1,	Sec.	8,	Clause	8)	In	the	same	spirit,	the	UN	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	states:	‘(1)	Everyone	has	the	right	freely	to	participate	in	the	cultural	life	of	the	community,	to	enjoy	the	arts	and	to	share	in	scientific	advancement	and	its	benefits.	(2)	Everyone	has	the	right	to	the	protection	of	the	moral	and	material	interests	resulting	from	scientific,	literary	or	artistic	production	of	which	he	is	the	author.’	(Article	27)		These	general	statements	of	principle	take	more	specific	form	in	the	Berne	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Literary	and	Artistic	Rights	(1886),	which	establishes	how	and	where	these	rights	apply,	and	continue	to	find	expression	in	such	policies	as	the	EU’s	Information	Society	Directive	(Recitals	10	&	11,	2001/29/EC).			 Encoded	within	these	balancing	principles	are	further	claims,	based	either	on	the	Lockean	property	or	natural	rights	of	individual	creators,	or	on	some	notion	of	collective,	utilitarian	welfare	benefit	(Stokes,	2003:	10-19).	These	are	not,	though,	discrete	alternatives.	As	Waldron	(1993)	notes,	artists	depend	on	others,	whether	in	the	form	of	prior	creative	work	and	traditions,	or	in	the	form	of	infrastructural	support.	The	rights	claimed	do	not	derive	only	from	the	labour	theory	of	value,	but	from	ideas	of	personal	integrity	and	rights	of	communication,	which	lead	to	the	suggestion	that	artists	should	be	seen	as	‘creators’,	rather	than	just	‘proprietors’	(Barron,	2006;	Biron,	2014).				 The	way	that	political	regimes	resolve	the	tension	between	these	conflicting	approaches	might	be	seen	to	exemplify	these	multiple	considerations.	Hence,	in	China	the	collectivist	principle	holds	sway	in	the	insistence	that	copyright	protection	is	directly	linked	‘to	the	building	of	a	socialist	society	that	is	
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advanced	ethically	and	materially,	and	promoting	the	progress	of	and	flourishing	of	socialist	cultures	and	sciences’	(Copyright	Law	of	the	PRC,	Art.	1).	While	in	liberal	political	regimes,	there	are	variations	between	those	that	recognize	the	artist’s	‘moral	rights’	(as	contained	in	the	Berne	Convention)	to	determine	how	their	work	might	be	used,	and	those	that	do	not.7	Other	variations	include	the	so-called	‘parody	exception’	–	the	right	to	use	existing	works	to	mock	or	satirize	–	that	is	recognized	in	some	jurisdictions,	but	not	others.		This	is	not	a	matter	of	technical	detail,	but	of	expressive	freedom	(Jacques,	2015).			 Copyright	as	a	property	claim	co-exists	with	copyright	as	an	integrity	claim	or	a	claim	to	freedom	of	expression	(Lee,	2015).	Which	principle	is	privileged	has	consequences	for	-	to	repeat	Runciman’s	definition	of	politics	-	‘the	collective	choices	that	bind	groups	of	people	to	live	in	a	particular	way’.		As	Alina	Ng	(2008:	424-25)	explains:		‘Shifting	the	ethics	for	copyright	from	a	utilitarian-based	approach,	which	justifies	property	rights	as	necessary	to	further	larger	public	goals,	towards	a	natural	rights	framework,	which	justifies	the	grant	of	rights	as	natural	entitlements,	allows	authorial	and	social	rights	in	literary	and	artistic	works	to	be	allocated	on	principles	of	fairness	and	justice.’		Copyright	policy	does	not	seek	to	resolve	only	the	tension	between	the	individual	and	the	collective,	but	to	define	what	constitutes	the	making	of	a	creative	or	original	contribution.	
																																																								7	This	right	is	typically	difficult	to	assert,	especially	in	the	U.S.,	which	has	applied	a	comparatively	narrow	interpretation	of	the	Berne	convention	and	where	a	patchwork	of	federal	and	state	provisions	applies	without	explicit	codification	for	‘moral	rights’	pertaining	to	music.	Musicians’	objections	to	the	use	of	their	music,	for	example	by	politicians,	typically	take	the	form	of	public	disavowals	(as	with	Neil	Young	and	Adele	against	Donald	Trump),	or	(as	with	Jackson	Browne	and	John	McCain)	appeals	to	the	property	provisions	of	copyright	and	other	IP	codes.	
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	 These	complex	issues	can	be	played	out	on	the	global	stage.	China’s	recent	reform	of	its	copyright	regime,	for	example,	while	still	framed	by	collectivist	principles,	has	been	driven	by	an	imperative	to	comply	with	the	rather	different	principles	and	values	of	the	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO),	the	World	Intellectual	Property	Organisation	(WIPO)	and	The	Agreement	on	Trade-Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights		(TRIPS)	protocols	(Halbert,	2014;	Street	et	al.,	2015).	In	a	similar	way,	the	European	Union	has	been	seeking	to	harmonize	its	copyright	regime	in	order	to	create	the	conditions	for	the	digital	single	market.	This	too	has	revealed	competing	priorities,	embodied	in	division	between	the	Commission	and	the	Parliament.	Where	the	former	has	justified	policy	reform	in	terms	of	the	commercial	value	to	be	realized,	the	latter	has	been	more	concerned	with	copyright’s	cultural	contribution.	These	are	not	mere	differences	of	emphasis,	but	of	principle	and	impact	(Dietz,	2014).			The	resolution	of	these	conflicts	matters	to	the	material	interests	of	creators,	corporations	and	consumers,	as	well	as	to	the	character	of	the	wider	culture	(Burkart,	2010;	Hesmondhalgh	et	al,	2015:	113-21;	Kretschmer,	2016).		It	also	engenders	debates	about	the	need	for	(and	value	of)	copyright.	Those	who	seek	its	abolition	contend	that	copyright	is	not	relevant	as	a	source	of	revenue	to	those	who	are	its	intended	beneficiaries	(typically,	musicians,	rather	than,	say,	fans):	‘If	we	were	to	abolish	copyright	today,	we	are	confident	that	the	most	important	effect	would	be	a	vast	increase	in	the	quantity	and	quality	of	music	available’	(Boldrin	and	Levine,	2008:	106).	Others	of	a	similar	inclination	refuse	to	acknowledge	the	founding	tenets	of	the	dominant	account	of	copyright:	‘Copyright	infringement	is	not	theft	because	copyright	is	not	a	kind	of	property	capable	of	being	stolen.	Copyright	is	a	limited	set	of	rights	that	gives	the	owner	
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the	ability	to	prevent	the	public	from	making	some	uses	of	creative	material	for	
some	length	of	time’	(Malcolm,	2014:	np).	For	these	critics,	copyright	is	to	be	explained	rather	than	justified,	and	the	explanation	is	to	be	found	in	the	material	interests	of	corporate	players,	and	in	the	capitalist	system	that	they	inhabit	(Stahl,	2013).		There	are	other	critics	who,	while	they	do	not	seek	the	abolition	of	copyright,	argue	that	there	is	a	mis-match	between	the	policy	and	the	actual	practice	of	contemporary	artists,	and	as	a	result	copyright	fails	to	sustain	a	culture	of	creativity.	The	extension	of	the	term	of	copyright	protection,	for	example,	has	been	argued	to	break	with	the	US	Constitution’s	commitment	to	culture	accessible	to	all	(Laing,	2004).	It	has	also	been	suggested	that	copyright	policy	enshrines	a	particular	European,	fine	art	tradition,	in	which	creativity	resides	with	the	work	of	a	solitary	genius	(Butt,	2015;	Rosen,	2008:	4-5).	Such	an	ideal	is	at	odds	with	the	collective	working	practices	of	musicians	(and	indeed	of	almost	all	art)	(Bently,	2009;	Firth,	2015).	For	similar	reasons,	rights	are	ascribed	to	the	melody	and	words	of	a	song,	but	not	the	arrangement,	the	rhythmic	patterns	or	the	other	sonic	features	contributed	by	the	accompanying	musicians.	Copyright	law,	to	this	extent,	privileges	particular	kinds	of	musical	expression,	and	fails	to	protect	other	forms.	Olufunmilayo	Arewa	(2006	and	2011)	has	sought	to	show	how	the	law	can	be	used	to	close	down	creativity	(in	particular,	in	the	use	of	music	samples).	‘Copyright	frameworks	that	reflect	a	broader	range	of	musical	practice’,	argues	Arewa	(2011:	1846),	‘will	facilitate	creations	by	innovative	musicians	who	might	otherwise	be	dissuaded	from	borrowing	to	create	music	because	of	copyright	conceptions	that	do	not	encompass	their	particular	forms	of	creativity.’		
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	In	summary,	we	have	argued	so	far	that	political	values	and	principles	are	implicated	in	copyright	policy,	and	that	these	give	rise	to	conflicts	that	matter	both	materially	and	culturally.	This	does	not	exhaust	the	politics	of	copyright,	if	only	because	of	the	very	general,	underdetermined	nature	of	the	principles	involved.		Underlying	the	politics	of	copyright	policy,	and	the	broad	political	principles	that	provides	its	rationale,	are	the	politics	of	copying.		Here	the	argument	is	about	what	is	meant	by,	and	valuable	in,	‘originality’	and	‘creativity’.	These	are	terms	that	have	often	been	overlooked	by	politics	scholars,	but	which	appeal	to,	and	depend	upon,	political	judgements	and	which	feed	into	wider	understandings	of	liberal	individuality.			
	
From	the	politics	of	copyright	to	the	politics	of	copying		Copyright	is	intended	to	protect	the	‘original’	and	to	weed	out	the	‘unauthorized	copy’.	As	such,	it	is	political	in	the	sense	that	it	affects	the	distribution	of	resources	and	establishes	rules	of	collective	behaviour.	But	the	politics	do	not	end	there;	they	extend	to	how	‘originality’	is	understood	(Rahmatian,	2011).		What	counts	as	‘original’,	as	Marcus	Boon	(2010:	49)	argues,	is	‘not	an	objective	fact	but	a	historically	specific	style	of	presentation.’	In	what	follows,	we	explore	how,	in	the	implementation	of	copyright	policy,	courts	construct	‘historically	specific’	notions	of	creativity	and	originality	that	are	themselves	politically	inflected.		‘[C]ourts	play	an	important	role,’	writes	Arewa	(2006:	641),	‘in	helping	to	determine	the	shape	and	nature	of	acceptable	cultural	production.’				We	begin	with	one	of	the	most	high-profile	of	recent	cases,	that	involving	the	song	‘Blurred	Lines’.	In	2015,	those	acting	on	behalf	of	the	singer	Marvin	
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Gaye	sued	Pharrell	Williams	and	Robin	Thicke,	the	composers	of	‘Blurred	Lines’	(2013),	for	infringement	of	copyright	(Williams	et	al	vs	Bridgeport	Music,	Inc.	Case	number:	2:13-cv-06004).	‘Blurred	Lines’,	it	was	claimed,	copied	Gaye’s	song	‘Got	to	Give	It	Up’	(1977).		The	ruling,	delivered	in	2015,	went	in	favour	of	Gaye,	and	the	composers	of	‘Blurred	Lines’	were	ordered	to	pay	$7.4m	in	compensation.8			While	the	court’s	decision	might	seem	to	be	just	another	case	of	plagiarism	punished,	much	more	was	entailed.	First,	there	was	the	question	of	what	exactly	was	being	protected	by	copyright	and	what	was	being	copied.	The	musicologists	who	appeared	for	the	prosecution,	consultant	Judith	Finell	and	Harvard	ethnomusicologist	Ingrid	Monson,	claimed	that	there	was	‘a	constellation	of	similarities’	between	the	two	songs	which	could	be	specifically	identified.	These	‘similarities’	were,	however,	contested	by	other	experts,	who	argued	that,	in	respect	of	those	elements	of	the	song	that	are	most	commonly	used	to	claim	protection	by	copyright	in	court	(the	lyrics	and	the	melody),	the	two	songs	had	virtually	nothing	in	common.	Typical	of	this	position	was	the	musicologist	Joe	Bennett	(2014),	who	contended	that	the	two	songs	were	different	in	the	beats	per	minute,	the	instrumentation,	the	lyrics,	the	melodies,	the	chord	patterns,	and	the	key.	Bennett,	like	a	number	of	other	critics,	argued	that	all	the	songs	had	in	common	were	a	‘feel’	and	‘groove’,	and	that	applying	copyright	to	these	would	be	to	risk	making	a	‘genre’	the	subject	of	copyright,	and	hence	to	harm	profoundly	a	culture	of	musical	creativity.	
																																																								8	The	compensation	was	reduced	to	$5.3m	in	July	2015,	and	in	December	2015	Williams	et	al	filed	an	appeal	(CA	No.	15-56880).			.	
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Other	musicologists	refused	this	stark	dichotomy	between	plagiarism	and	originality.	Robert	Fink	(2015),	for	instance,	insisted	that	it	was	necessary	to	look	beyond	any	‘surface	coincidences’	and	to	demonstrate	how	the	songs	‘at	a	deeper	level’	contained	‘melodic,	harmonic,	and	rhythmic’	similarities.	Fink	(2015,	np;	his	emphasis)	argued:		One	of	the	incorrect	lessons	observers	are	drawing	from	this	verdict	is	that	it	means	you	can	be	sued	for	copying	the	‘feel’	or	‘vibe’	of	an	existing	song.	Nothing	could	be	further	from	the	truth.	The	argument	was	ostensively	made,	and	ostensively	accepted	by	the	jury,	only	on	the	basis	of	similarities	that	could	be	captured	in	musical	notation.		In	reaching	its	verdict	on	this	basis,	the	court	was	privileging	music	that	could	be	notated	in	respect	of	the	dominant	values	of	white	western	art	music	(melody,	chord	sequence	and	structure,	and	the	semantic	understandings	of	lyrics	–	those	aspects	identified	by	Bennett	in	his	critique),	rather	than	in	respect	of	the	aesthetic	qualities	valued	in	much	African	America	music	(rhythm,	feel,	timbre,	texture,	lyrical	and	vocal	gesture).	In	discriminating	in	this	way	between	what	was	to	be	valued	for	the	purposes	of	copyright,	the	‘Blurred	Lines’	case,	Fink	(2015)	suggested,	was	informed	by	a	racial	politics	and	history	of	appropriation,	and	that	it	offered:		a	way	to	punish	an	unsympathetic	pair	of	defendants	and	right,	at	least	by	proxy,	a	whole	history	of	unfair	appropriation	…	Not	only	did	Thicke	and	Williams	embarrass	themselves	in	court,	they	did	it	against	Marvin	Gaye,	perhaps	the	tragic	example	of	how	African-Americans	have	struggled	for	artistic	freedom	within	a	music	industry	built	on	the	systematic	exploitation	of	their	labor	and	creativity	
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Read	like	this,	copyright	brings	into	play	a	broader	awareness	of	the	history	of	appropriation	within	a	political	economy	of	African	American	music.			 Also	implicated	in	the	‘Blurred	Lines’	case	-	and	copyright	more	generally	–	is	the	further	question	of	what	constitutes	a	‘work’	–	that	which	may	or	may	not	be	copied	(Pila,	2010).	The	answer	to	this	is	also	a	matter	of	politics.	As	Mireille	Van	Eechoud	(2014:	163)	notes:	‘The	work	concept	…	causes	law	to	favour	scored	music	over	improvisation,	melody	over	harmony	and	rhythm,	to	give	author-composers	more	power	than	performers.’		In	other	words,	court	interpretations	of	copyright	law	serve	to	recognize	particular	forms	of	music	and	to	distribute	rewards	to	specific	actors	(composers)	in	acknowledgement	of	their	skills	(and	hence,	not	to	recognize	other	musical	forms,	performers	and	skills).9			 The	legal	construction	of	the	work	and	of		originality	are	not	bound		by	ordinary	language	understandings	of	terms	such	as	‘novelty’	or	‘innovation’	or	indeed	‘creativity’.10		‘Original’	refers	only	to	the	act	of	originating	something,	irrespective	of	its	finer	qualities	(or	lack	thereof).11	All	that	is	required	to	determine	whether	something	has	been	copied	depends	on	matters	of	‘similarity’	and	‘access’.	The	first	concerns	the	resemblance	between	two	works;	the	second	involves	the	question	of	whether	the	defendant	had	access	to	the	copied	work.	Both	issues	are	tested	in	court,	but	where	everyday	understandings	of	originality	
																																																								9	A	football	match	does	not	qualify	as	a	work	for	the	purposes	of	copyright,	according	to	the	CJEU,	because	the	game	is	determined	by	its	rules,	and	therefore	does	not	allow	for	‘creative	freedom’	on	the	part	of	the	players	(individually	or	collectively)	(Van	Gompel,	2014:	100).		10	French	IP	law,	for	example,	provides	no	definition	of	‘originality’;	whereas	UK	law	is	silent	on	‘creativity’.	11	Judicial	notions	of	‘originality’	tend	to	combine	Romanticism	with	a	narrowly	understood	labour	theory	of	value	(Barron,	2006;	Lutticken,	2002).	
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do	not	apply,	‘common	sense’	is	used	to	determine	whether	copying	has	occurred..		Juries	or	judges	decide	whether	‘in	human	experience’	it	is	possible	that	‘the	two	works	could	have	been	independently	created.’	The	courts	ask	whether	a	‘reasonable	juror	could	find	substantial	similarity	of	ideas	or	expression’	or		‘whether	the	ordinary,	reasonable	audience’	would	see	substantial	similarity	in	the	‘total	concept	and	feel	of	the	works’	(Loomis	vs	Cornish,	US	District	Court,	Central	District	of	California,	CV12-5525	RSWL(JEMx)).		And	judges	rule	as	to	whether	or	not	the	use	of	the	same	words	or	images	in	two	songs	was	a	coincidence;	that	is,	the	unavoidable	consequence	of	a	shared,	common	culture	(Peters	vs	West,	No.	11-1708,	7th	Circuit,	20012).12		In	short,	judgements	as	to	whether	copying	has	occurred	depends	on	appeals	to	the	notion	of	an	‘ordinary’	and	‘reasonable’	jury	or	audience,	or	to	the	idea	of	a	‘common	culture’.	These	might	be	seen	as	appeals	to	principles	of	democratic	justice,	but	they	depend	on	the	highly	contestable	notion	of	what	is	‘normal’	or	‘common’.13		Just	as	courts	create	rules	and	methods	for	defining	what	is	‘original’	in	a	‘work’,	they	also	establish	narratives	of	creativity,	determining	who	is	responsible	for	the	original	contribution.	There	is	a	tendency	to	assume	a	single	originating	author,	discounting	the	possibility	of	collective	creativity	(Barron,	2006;	Bently,	2009;	Free,	2002).		This	assumption	has	generated	a	long	history	of	court	cases	in	which	members	of	bands	have	gone	to	court	in	pursuit	of	the	claim	that	they	made	an																																																									12	The	case	involved	Kanye	West,	and	one	issue	was	whether	the	phrase	‘what	does	not	kill	you,	makes	you	stronger’,	which	featured	in	the	song,	was	in	common	usage.	13	Decisions	of	this	type	are	not	exclusive	to	the	US	courts,	but	the	determination	of	copyright	abuse	varies	considerably	across	jurisdictions.		
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original	contribution	to	the	success	of	those	groups,	but	were	not	justly	acknowledged	or	rewarded	for	that	contribution.14		Courts	are	required	to	determine	who	has	made	‘an	original	contribution	to	the	Work’	(Fisher	vs	Brooker,	2006,	para	42).		In	the	making	of	such	judgements,	the	idea	of	originality	can	become	unhitched	from	its	neutral	understanding,	and	become	instead	freighted	with	political	values	and	perspectives.		As	Jane	Gaines	(1991:	12)	argues:	‘Judicial	discourse	…	will	hold	forth	on	the	strict	legal	definition	of	“original	work”	as	nothing	more	than	a	work	produced	by	an	originator.	But	it	may	then	abruptly	lapse	into	value	judgements	that	betray	preference	for	elite	culture’s	dismissal	of	anything	that	is	“imitative”	or	genuinely	“original”.’		In	the	case	that	Gaines	has	in	mind,	it	was	not	the	words	of	a	song	(and	their	‘originality’)	that	was	at	issue.	It	was	a	matter	of	whether	a	vocal	style	deserved	copyright	protection.	The	singer	Nancy	Sinatra	brought	a	case	in	which	she	claimed	that	her	vocal	mannerisms	were	being	deliberately	and	illegitimately	imitated	in	an	advertisement.	Her	claims	to	her	own	sound	and	style	were	being	infringed.	Sinatra	saw	copyright	law	as	a	way	of	protecting	her	integrity	and	identity.		The	court	decided	otherwise.	Sinatra’s	vocal	style	was	not	deemed	to	be	‘property’	to	be	owned	by,	in	this	case,	the	singer	(Gaines,	1991:	115).	
Duplication	is	prohibited,	it	was	decided;	imitation	is	not	(Gaines,	1991:	121).	For	Gaines	(1991:	9),	the	law’s	understanding	of	‘likeness’	set	limits	to	‘the	available	pool	of	expressive	gestures’.	It	did	so	on	the	basis	of		a	particular	account	of	property	rights.		And	implicit	in	Gaines’	criticism	of	the	decision	was	an																																																									14	They	include	Procul	Harum,	The	Smiths,	Barclay	James	Harvest,	The	Bluebells,	and	Spandau	Ballet.			
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alternative	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	art	and	the	artist.	Rather	than	being	a	matter	of	property	ownership,	art	was	to	be	seen	as	an	extension	of	the	person.	15		The	issue	of	ownership	also	arose	in	the	‘Blurred	Lines’	trial,	where	Robin	Thicke’s	attorney	argued	that	‘no	one	owns	a	genre	or	a	style	or	a	groove’	(quoted	in	Brown,	2015).		Insofar	as	the	finding	of	the	court	was	that	a	style	could	be	plagiarized,	Fink	(2015)	argued	that	the	payment	awarded	to		Marvin	Gaye’s	estate	entailed	the	monetizing	of		‘black	creativity’,	and	provided	‘intellectual	justification	for	fencing	off	more	of	our	shared	heritage	of	sounds,	grooves,	vibes,	tunes	and	feels	from	the	people	who	need	it	most’.16		This	is	not	necessarily	a	critique	of	copyright	as	such,	but	rather	a	recognition	that	the	decisions	made	in	its	name	have	wide-ranging	cultural	and	political	significance.		Creativity	is	not	a	product	of	an	unfettered	imagination,	but	of	a	shared	culture	and	of	a	regulatory	regime	(Negus	and	Pickering,	2004).	Indeed,	Jon	Elster	(2000)	contends	that	creativity	depends	on	working	within	the	constraints	imposed	upon	it,	rather	than	on	ignoring	or	defying	them.	It	entails	borrowing	and	playing	with	the	styles	adopted	by	others,	and	copyright	can	either	facilitate	or	hamper	this	process.	As	Stef	Van	Gompel	(2014:	112)	argues:		Copyright	law	recognizes	creative	constraints	imposed	by	rules	of	genres	in	literature,	film,	visual	arts,	music,	and	so	on,	insofar	as	‘style’	is	
																																																								15	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	there	are	instances	where	a	performer’s	right	to	their	distinctive	style	is	protected,	as	was	demonstrated	in	cases	involving	Tom	Waits	and	Bette	Midler.	The	protection	afforded,	though,	derives	from	rights	of	‘publicity’,	not	copyright	(Demers,	2006:	59-67).		Our	thanks	to	one	of		our	Political	Studies’	referees	for	this	point.		16	Similar	concerns	have	been	expressed	about	how	the	extension	of	the	copyright	term	to	70	years	has	made	much	cultural	heritage	unavailable	and	inaccessible	(Heald	et	al.,	2015)		
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excluded	from	protection.	This	means	that	authors	are	free	to	use	the	shared	characteristics	of	form,	content,	style,	or	mood	of	existing	genres,	as	long	as	they	refrain	from	copying	the	original	expression	of	specific	works	within	those	genres.		So	where	Gaines	sees	the	need	to	protect	‘style’	in	the	name	of	individual	integrity,	Van	Gompel	argues	that	‘style’	represents	a	common	resource	for	a	democratic	culture.	What	are	being	contested	here	are	not	just	the	conditions	of	creativity,	but	the	definition	of	originality	and	what	it	represents.		These	matters	touch,	as	we	have	seen,	on	notions	of	property	and	individual	integrity,	and	on	assumptions	about	what	marks	‘originality’	and	how	responsibility	might	be	attributed.		They	raise	questions	of	racial	and	cultural	politics,	and	of	identity,	individuality	and	generic	or	stylistic	convention.					
Sampling	and	the	politics	of	copying	The	politics	implicated	in	copyright	come	into	especially	sharp	focus	when	we	consider	the	example	of	sampling,	the	re-use	of	recorded	elements	of	musical	works	to	create	a	new	work.		Sampling	might	seem	to	be	a	practice	of	minor	aesthetic	or	cultural	detail,	but	not	only	is	it	a	widely	used	musical	technique	(with	equivalents	in	other	cultural	forms,	including	literature	and	film),	but	it	too	engages	with	a	complex	politics	of	ownership,	discrimination	and	cultural	rights.	While	it	varies	with	jurisdiction,	the	law	on	sampling	has	been	established	over	time,	in	response	to	the	technology	that	has	made	it	an	increasingly	easy	and	more	common	creative	technique.	The	1980s	are	seen	as	a	‘golden	age’	of	sampling,	when	the	law	was	unformed	and	those	responsible	for	administering	it	were	either	ignorant	or	indifferent.	This	changed	in	the	1990s,	when	the	need	to	
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get	permission	for	samples	became	–	effectively	–	mandatory	(McLeod	and	DiCola,	2011:	20-35).			In	the	new	order,	according	to	Kembrew	McLeod	and	Peter	DiCola	(2011:	16;	see	also	Arewa,	2006),	copyright	law	served	to	‘discriminate[s]	against	sampling.’		What	this	means	is	that	the	freedom	to	borrow	allowed	for	by	(US)	copyright	law	–	the	right	to	parody,	to	make	cover	versions,	to	mimic	a	style	–	does	not	extend	to	‘fragments	of	sound	recordings’	(McLeod	and	DiCola,	2011:	16).		Thus,	those	who	use	this	particular	creative	form	are	restricted	in	ways	that	other	artists	are	not.	As	a	result,	writes	Martin	Scherzinger	(2014:	176),	‘copyright	law	applies	unevenly	to	different	musical	genres,	often	tinged	with	an	ethnically	inflected	bias’.		Yin	Harn	Lee	(2015)	draws	a	similar	conclusion,	based	on	a	systematic	review	of	sampling	cases	in	the	US	and	Europe.	The	courts	have,	she	contends,	made	the	creative	use	of	samples	either	difficult	or	prohibitively	expensive.	It	is	difficult	both	because	the	granting	of	a	licence	may	be	matter	of	‘whim’	on	behalf	of	the	right	holders.		It	is	expensive	because	fees	for	samples	may	range	from	$100	to	$10,000.		The	result	is	a	restriction	‘on	users’	exercise	of	their	creativity’	(Lee,	2015:	124;	see	also	Jacques,	2016	and	Vaidhyanathan,	S.,	2003).	‘	 Two	US	court	decisions	in	particular,	argues	Lee	(2015:	125),	‘have	created	a	bright-line	rule	that	effectively	precludes	all	such	sampling,	regardless	of	the	quantity	or	quality	of	the	samples	taken’.	In	one	of	these	cases	–	involving	a	sample	of	Gilbert	O’Sullivan’s	‘Alone	Again	(Naturally)’	–	the	judge	branded	sampling	as	‘theft’	or	‘stealing’.	No	allowance	was	made	for	the	fact	that	sampling	was	widely	practiced	and	might	be	deemed	a	legitimate	‘art	form’	(Theberge,	2004:	151).		In	the	second	case	–	involving	the	hip	hop	group	NWA	–	the	court	
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determined	that	‘substantial	similarity’	was	not	relevant.	To	take	a	copyrighted	extract	was	an	offence	in	itself,	even	if	it	was	then	transformed	(by	looping,	pitch	control	and	other	manipulation	techniques)	out	of	all	recognition.17		While	almost	all	musical	traditions	have	depended	upon	creative	borrowing,	the	law	on	sampling	had	an	especially	adverse	effect	on	those	who	borrow	in	this	particular	way.		 But	the	politics	of	sampling	do	not	just	lie	with	the	restrictions	imposed	on	those	who	sample	but	also	on	those	who	are	sampled.	David	Hesmondhalgh	(2006)	takes	the	case	of	the	musician	Moby	and	his	album	Play.	This	extremely	successful	record	–	each	track	of	which	became	a	soundtrack	to	an	advert	–	sampled	music	from	a	range	of	artists,	especially	African	American	ones.		While	Hesmondhalgh	(2006:	54)	declares	himself	sympathetic	to	the	claim	that	copyright	law	has	unjustly	hampered	the	creativity	of	samplers,	he	draws	attention	to	the	‘complex	cultural	politics’	involved.		One	aspect	of	these	politics	is		the	effect	of	borrowing	–	in	the	form	of	a	sample	–	on	‘more	vulnerable	social	groups’	and	the	possibility	of	‘unethical	borrowing	practices’	(Hesmondhalgh,	2006:	55	&	57).		Hesmondhalgh	argues	that	Moby’s	use	of	samples	is	an	example	of	an	unethical	appropriation	that	serves	to	advance	Moby’s	interests,	and	to	efface	those	of	whom	he	samples.	Hesmondhalgh	is	not	claiming	that	anything	illegal	or	underhand	was	done;	the	samples	were	licensed	and	the	right	holders	
																																																								17	There	are	signs	that	the	law	is	changing	on	this,	becoming	more	relaxed	in	what	it	prohibits,	albeit	to	the	advantage	of	established	stars.	See	VMG	Salsoul	vs	Madonna	Ciccone,	9th	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals,	June	2016,	D.C.	Case	No:	2:12-cv-05967-BRO-CW	
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compensated.18	His	point	is	that	this	compensation	fails	to	acknowledge	a	more	profound	injustice.		Against	this	charge,	Barry	Shank	(2014)	weighs	in	the	balance	the	pleasures	to	be	derived	from	Moby’s	use	of	African	American	voices.	These	pleasures	constitute	the	songs’	‘political	force’,	and	this	latter	‘cannot	be	canceled	by	claims	of	appropriation,	no	matter	how	accurate	those	claims	may	be.’	(Shank,	2014:	37).		Whatever	Shank	means	by	music’s	‘political	force’,	his	argument	with	Hesmondhalgh	derives	from	essentially	contested	claims	about	culture	and	cultural	heritage,	about	individual	integrity,	and	about	the	conditions	of	creativity	and	the	morality	of	copying.		To	this	extent,	their	debate	serves	to	underline	the	political	stakes	in	copyright,	stakes	that,	as	we	show	in	the	next	section,	are	confronted	and	resolved	by	musicians	in	their	working	lives.			
Making	music,	making	claims	In	focusing	on	the	pronouncements	of	courts	and	policy-makers,	and	in	building	on	our	claims	about	the	politics	of	copyright	from	these,	there	is	a	danger	that	we	overlook	the	routine	practices	and	understandings	of	those	who	are	most	directly	involved	in	the	process.	It	is	one	thing	to	examine	the	principles	which	copyright	embodies	and	the	interpretations	put	upon	them	by	the	courts,	it	is	quite	another	to	suggest	that	this	is	how	creativity	and	originality	are	lived.			We	know	from	experimental	evidence	that	the	value	placed	on	intellectual	property	does	not	conform	straightforwardly	to	the	assumptions	made	by	those	who	posit	rational	economic	actors	(Buccafusco	and	Sprigman,	
																																																								18	Although	the	beneficiary	may	not	be	the	artist	if	they	do	not	hold	the	copyright.	
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2010).	But	if	they	do	not	fit	the	standard	economic	model,	how	do	musicians	and	others	see	copyright	and	its	relationship	to	their	creative	practices?	We	report	here	on	interviews	conducted	with	musicians	and	others	in	the	music	industry	in	which	their	attitudes	to,	and	perceptions	of,	copyright,	creativity,	originality	and	copying	were	explored.19	Musicians	and	songwriters	readily	acknowledge	that	they	learn	their	craft	through	imitation.20	This	was	true	of	those	we	spoke	to,	and	of	those	interviewed	by	others	(Rachel,	2013;	Zollo,	2003;	musician,	personal	interview,	28	January	2014).	Musicians	as	diverse	as	Mick	Jones	of	The	Clash	and	the	avant-garde	composer	John	Cage	have	admitted	that	their	work	leaned	heavily	upon	that	of	others	(Perrett,	2014).		Musicians	admit	that	copying	was	either	an	expectation	of	their	employment	or	was	a	product	of	an	ever	more	demanding	workload	(songwriter	and	producer,	personal	interview,	20	March	2014).	‘In	the	olden	days,’	one	musician	(personal	interview,	6	October	2014)	told	us,	‘if	I	came	up	with	a	tune	that	sounded	a	bit	like	something	else,	I	would	dismiss	it	instantly.		…	but	now,	slowly,	and	just	through	sheer	demand,	because	I	have	to	write	a	song	a	week	and	produce	it	and	get	it	out,	because	that’s	the	business	…	I	never	consciously	rip	anything	off	….It’s	copying	but	it’s	not	plagiarism	as	such…	music	has	always	been	a	progression	about	people	learning	from	each	other.’		It	is	possible	to	read	into	this	answer	the	anxieties	and	dilemmas	that	songwriters	experience,	and	how	they	justify	their	relationship	to	the	work	of	others.	The	law	plays	a	very	minor,	even	non-existent,	part	in	these	deliberations,	but	a	
																																																								19	We	conducted	semi-structured	interviews	with	twenty-five	professional	musicians,	songwriters,	managers	and	producers.		20	As	one	of	our	referees	noted,	the	same	may	not	apply	to	other	cultural	forms	–	comedy,	for	example,	where	convention	holds	that	jokes	are	not	to	be	stolen.		
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judgement	evidently	is	present.	Another	musician	explained	how	they	felt	on	being	told	that	their	song	sounded	very	like	one	by	another	well	known	musician:	‘As	soon	as	they	said	it,	it	was	like,	“Yes,	it	is,	isn’t	it?”	We	ummed	and	ahhed,	but	it	was	different	enough,	we	felt,	to	not	have	to	worry	about	him	coming	in	touch	but	it’s	normally	like	that.	...	We	don’t	consciously	copy.’	(personal	interview,	26	August	2014)	One	songwriter	told	us	that	learning	by	copying	was	just	‘lazy’	(personal	interview,	28	March	2014),	while	The	Eagles’	Don	Henley	described	copyists	as	vandals	who	‘go	into	a	museum	and	paint	a	moustache	on	somebody	else’s	painting’	(Michaels,	2014).		The	fact	of	these	very	different	views	serves	only	to	emphasise	that	‘copying’	is	not	a	straightforward	matter,	either	practically	or	ethically	(Gripsrud,	2014).		‘Copying’	invites	at	least	two	discrete	sets	of	consideration.	One	is	about	obligations	to	others	–	typically,	other	musicians.	This	requires	respecting	their	work	and	their	right	to	claim	authorship.	The	other	is	about	creativity,	about	claiming	originality	for	one’s	own	work:	‘our	ethos	really	is	that	we	want	to	try	and	do	something	completely	new’	(musician,	personal	interview,	26	August	2014).		But	being	‘original’,	making	‘new’	sounds,	is	not	straightforward.	One	musician	put	it	like	this:	‘Even	if	I’ve	taken	a	big	chunk	of	the	music	they’ve	composed,	I've	done	something	to	it	to	make	it	not	their	idea	anymore,	you	know.’	(personal	interview,	18	December	2013)		It	can	vary	with	genre	or	form.	Improvising	jazz	musicians	expect	to	‘quote’	from	others	(personal	interview,	25	January	2014).		Session	musicians,	paid	to	produce	a	particular	sound,	do	not	claim	‘ownership’	of	the	sound	they	make;	but	if	they	are	asked	to	‘compose’	a	tune,	then	the	relationship	changes,	as	does	the	expected	reward	and	recognition	(Session	musicians,	personal	interviews,	22	March	2014	and	29	October	2013).		
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The	dilemmas	around	creativity	and	credit	also	emerge	in	the	context	of	collective	work.	Attributing	copyright	to	an	individual	or	to	a	group	has	real	resource	implications,	and	decisions	about	whether	to	share	credit	are	political	ones,	about	which	those	in	the	music	industry	are	very	sensitive	(manager,	personal	interview,	22	April	2014;	musician,	personal	interview,	14	March	2014).		These	dilemmas	become	more	acute	and	significant	when	large	sums	of	money	are	involved.	One	musician	spoke	of	how	he	lost	£500,000	in	a	court	case	over	who	had	contributed	to	the	writing	of	a	hit	song	(personal	interview,	12	January	2015).	Running	through	these	responses	to	the	dilemmas	with	which	musicians	and	others	deal	is	the	notion	of	‘fairness’.		Individuals	talk	about	the	need	for	fairness	in	respect	of	rewards	and	recognition	(NeYo,	2015);	those	who	represent	the	collective	interests	of	artists	and	their	publishers	speak	of	‘fair	rules	and	fair	regulations’	(CISAC,	2015);	and	those	who	responded	to	the	EU’s	consultation	on	copyright	policy	wanted	to	see	a	more	fair	system	(Dobusch,	2014).	How	‘fairness’	is	understood	varies,	but	it	always	entails	a	political	rights	claim.	This	means	something	very	different	to	the	terms	in	which	the	standard	business	model	identifies	IP	rights.	Indeed,	it	is	striking	how	little	the	law,	and	the	copyright	regime	in	particular,	features	in	the	interviews	we	conducted	(where	we	were	talking	explicitly	about	‘copying’).	The	musicians	claim	ownership	and	they	acknowledge	that	they	copy	and	crib,	but	in	doing	so	they	sound	more	like	citizens	negotiating	conflicting	political	and	moral	codes,	than	legal	clients	registering	claims	or	business	people	identifying	revenue	streams.	Their	working	practices	are	further	evidence	of	the	political	character	of	copying	and	copyright.	This	argument	does	not	just	apply	as	a	contrast	to	the	business-
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based	account	of	rights,	it	also	applies	for	those	like	Lawrence	Lessig	and	others	who	wish	to	minimize	the	role	of	copyright.	As	Ethan	Plaut	(2015:	4;	see	also,	Sibley,	2015:	53)	points	out,	the	Lessig	approach	overlooks	‘what	of	the	self	–	not	only	labor,	but	also	elements	of	one’s	identity	–	inheres	in	cultural	products’.	It	is	not	a	relationship	of	ownership.	They	do	not	see	themselves	as	‘owners’	of	their	art,	but	rather	they	see	their	art	as	coterminous	with	their	identity	and	integrity.					
Conclusion	This	article	has	argued	that	copyright	and	copyright	policy	deserves	more	attention	than	it	has	so	far	received	from	political	science.	Our	argument	has	been	that	copyright	is	of	political	importance	in	two	general	ways.		First,	because	of	copyright’s	economic	role,	policy	has	implications	for	the	distribution	of	resources	and	rewards.	This	distribution	is	determined	by	both	the	interests	of	stakeholders	and	the	political	principles	to	which	copyright	appeals.	These	principles	appeal	to	more	than	straightforward	property	rights	claims,	and	their	enactment	entails	a	range	of	other	values	and	judgements,	and	may	result	in	forms	of	discrimination.	To	this	extent,	copyright	policy	contributes	to	politics	as	the	collective	rules	by	which	we	live.	More	than	this,	though,	we	have	contended	that	copyright	gives	shape	to	ideas	of	individual	integrity	and	of	cultural	expression,	and	perhaps	most	significantly	to	ideas	of	creativity	and	originality	upon	which	liberal	theory	draws,	but	rarely	examines	in	practice.		As	a	form	of	knowledge	regulation,	copyright	builds	upon	widely	accepted	views	that	all	forms	of	originality	and	creativity	depend	on	borrowing	and	imitation,	and	that	copyright	policy	in	principle	and	practice	adjudicates	
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politically	acceptable	and	unacceptable	forms	of	copying.	What	matters	is	how	it	does	this	and	whose	interests	are	served	in	the	process.		Copyright	law	is	not	just	about	the	distribution	of	the	money	that	derives	from	creative	work.	The	law	instantiates	certain	values;	it	constitutes	a	moral	order.	Similarly,	the	law	serves	to	regulate	market	transactions	that	also	encode	a	morality	(Sandel,	2012).	This	is	clearly	the	case	with	copyright	where	ideas	of	authorship	and	originality	are	key.	The	writer	Cory	Doctorow	(2014:	153)	has	argued	that	‘money	can’t	be	the	sole	determinant	of	whether	copyright	is	working’,	adding	that:	‘I	think	we	can	tell	a	good	copyright	system	from	a	bad	one	by	what	kind	of	work	gets	made	under	its	rules’.	Our	argument,	while	echoing	the	tenor	of	these	claims,	would	add	a	qualification	to	Doctorow’s	statement:	‘We	can	tell	a	good	copyright	system	from	a	bad	one	by	what	kinds	of	
political	principle	inform	its	rules,	how	decisions	are	made,	and	what	interests	are	
recognized	in	the	process.’			The	business	of	being	‘original’	is	not	simply	a	matter	of	formal	legal	definition,	but	the	result	of	a	complex	interplay	of	lobbying,	legal	interpretation	and	everyday	practice,	among	many	other	factors.	Understanding	this	is	important	to	understanding	how	one	vital	aspect	of	the	modern	economy	operates	and	the	role	that	policy	and	the	political	process	plays	in	it.	But,	we	would	like	to	suggest,	there	is	more	entailed.	In	constituting	notions	of	originality	and	creativity,	copyright	is	not	just	serving	to	organize	the	creative	industries.	It	is	also	serving	to	construct	a	particular	understanding	of	‘originality’,	which,	as	we	mentioned	at	the	beginning,	occupies	a	central	place	in	notions	of	the	liberal	human	subject.		
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